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'A Matter of Humanity'? Emerging Principles
Relating to Deportation and Human Rights
The sovereign power to control the entry and residence of persons in the state,
and the corollary power to deport, has long been considered to be a defining
feature of statehood and is, as Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti observe,'a partic-
ularly sharp and resonant way of asserting state power in the realm of border
control'.' Speaking in the Supreme Court in FP vMinister for Justice, Equality and
Law Reform,2 Hardiman J commented that the inherent nature of states' powers
to deport individuals
is demonstrated by their assertion over a vast period of history, from the very earliest
emergence of states as such, and its existence in all contemporary states even
though these vary widely in their constitutional, legal and economic regimes, and
the extent to which the Rule of Law is recognised.
In Ireland, the volume of judicial review applications in the sphere of deporta-
tion in recent years is striking, with the impact of these cases reaching beyond
immigration and asylum law to affect more general principles of administrative
and constitutional law.4
The complex body of jurisprudence on the limits of state power in relation
to deportation shows that the extensive state discretion as to who may remain
within the national border is tempered by reference to international and
European Union (EU) legal obligations, as well as domestic fundamental rights
principles.s This article examines a number of recent decisions which nonethe-
less illustrate the enduring sharpness of the power to deport in the Irish context.
1. Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti (eds), The Social Political and Historical Contours of
Deportation (Springer 2013) 1. See also Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in
American History (Harvard University Press 2010); Bloch and Schuster'At the extremes
of exclusion: Deportation, detention and dispersal' (2005) 28(3) Ethnic and Racial
Studies 491; and De Genova and Peutz, The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space,
and the Freedom of Movement (Duke University Press 2010).
2. [2002] 1 IR 164.
3. ibid 168.
4. See, for example, Laurentiu v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [1999]
4 IR 26;Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3.
5. Key decisions in this regard include Lobe and Osayande v Minister for Justice [2003] 1
IR 1; Baby 0 v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 169; [2008] I ESC 25; Meadows vMinister for
Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3.
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It begins by outlining the relevant statutory framework for deportation in Ireland
and then briefly sketches the evolution of the jurisprudence, before proceeding
to examine the Court of Appeal's decisions in the related cases of Dos Santos v
Minister for Justice and Equality6 and Clv Minister for Justice and Equality,' and the
Supreme Court decision in PO v Minister for Justice and Equality.'
The Statutory Framework for Deportation and Removal
Deportation is regulated by s 3 of the Immigration Act 1999,' with the power
of the Minister for Justice to, by order,'require any non-national ... to leave the
State ... and to remain thereafter out of the State' set out in s 3(1). The person
concerned must be notified of the Minister's proposal to make a deportation
order, giving them the opportunity to make representations in writing to the
Minister10 which must be duly taken into account before the final decision is
made."
The Minister's power is qualified by a statutory prohibition on refoulement,
which prohibits the return of individuals to states where, in the opinion of
the Minister, 'the life or freedom of the person would be threatened for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, or'there is a serious risk that the person would be subjected
to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment'.12 In addition, the Courts have confirmed that the Minister must
consider the European Convention on Human Rights13 and the constitutional
rights of the person concerned. In principle, an expulsion can be opposed
on the grounds that it will breach any Convention right, although in practice
Articles 3 (the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading
treatment) and 8 (the right to respect for one's private and family life) are most
relevant to expulsion cases.14 Of these provisions, Article 3 provides the stron-
ger protection, if proven, due to the absolute nature of the Article. Article 8,
on the other hand, is qualified and thus the individual rights at stake are bal-
anced with more general considerations including public order and the needs
of the immigration system. The question of which constitutional rights can
6. [2015] IECA 210.
7. [2015] IECA 192.
8. [2015]l ESC 64.
9. The International Protection Act 2015, when commenced, will govern the deporta-
tion of those who have made a protection application.
10. s 3(b)(i).
11. s 3(b)(i) and notification of that decision is provided for in s 3(b)(ii)).
12. s 5 of Refugee Act 1996; s 50 of the International Protection Act 2015 (not yet
commenced).
13. In accordance with ss 3(1) and 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act
2003.
14. For commentary, see Clayton, Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law (6th edn,
Oxford University Press 2014) 573.
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form the basis for a challenge to deportation is yet to be fully tested, although
Articles 41 and 42 are frequently invoked in cases involving Irish citizens with
non-citizen family members.
Deportation as an Element of the 'Common Good': Executive
Discretion and Judicial Deference
Deportation was rarely used and was hardly ever the subject of legal challenge
prior to the 1 990s, after which point Ireland experienced economic growth,
increased immigration, and (to borrow Gibney's phrase) a corresponding
'deportation turn'" The early cases, in particular, set down the marker of the
executive power of the State to control the entry and residence of 'aliens'.
Giving the decision of the High Court in Osheku vlreland,16 Gannon J expressly
linked the rights of the State to control immigration with the maintenance of
social order, opining that:
The integrity of the State constituted as it is for the collective body of its citizens
within the national territory must be defended and vindicated by the organs of the
State and by the citizens so that there may be true social order within the territory
and concord maintained with other nations in accordance with the objectives
declared in the preamble to the Constitution.17
The idea of the duty of the State (by way of executive action in most instances)
to protect the 'common good' by guarding the polity against the risks
posed by non-citizens is a recurring theme of the Irish jurisprudence and is
enshrined in the governing legislation." This reflects the place of migration
law in the liberal theorising of the national community." The association
between deportation and the 'common good' has taken on a renewed cur-
rency in the context of the ongoing international securitisation of migration
issues, whereby irregular migrants are constructed as threats to the integrity
and security of states. 20
Although the power of deportation and removal is regulated by statute,
executive discretion and judicial deference have been the central features
15. Gibney, 'Asylum and the Expansion of Deportation in the United Kingdom'
(2008) 43(2) Government and Opposition 146. On these trends, see generally,
Gilmartin, Ireland and Migration in the Twenty-First Century (Manchester University
Press 2015).
16. [1986] R 733.
17. ibid.
18. See, for example, s 3 of the Immigration Act 1999.
19. Dauvergne,'Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times'(2004) 67(4)
MLR 588, referring to inter alia, Walzer, Spheres of Justice:A Defense of Pluralism and
Equality (Basic Books 1983) ch 2.
20. See generally Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century (Polity 2009).
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of the deportation regime, in common with many countries worldwide. 21
The system is based on and dominated by ministerial decision-making, with
'exceptions' to the law playing a crucial role.22 There is no route to appeal a
deportation decision other than by way of an application for judicial review
in the High Court: a process review only, which does not look at the merits
of the decision.23 Judicial review of immigration and asylum decisions is cir-
cumscribed by the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000.24 In spite of these
restrictions, the judicial review process has become more intensive over time.
MacMenamin J's comments in 2015 in the Supreme Court in PO (in connec-
tion with the decision of the Minister not to revoke a deportation order) show
a clear evolution in thinking since cases such as Osheku:
the Minister is obliged to operate within the boundaries of natural and
constitutional justice, and also to decide in accordance with the international
obligations which have been incorporated into domestic law by the Oireachtas.
The Minister is not entitled to act unconstitutionally. She must determine every
application on its merits.This includes operating within the boundaries of the 1999
Act itself, and, more broadly, the Constitution, the European Convention on Human
Rights, as explained by the ECtHR, and the principle of proportionality, all of which
must be applied to the circumstances of the case.25
What is involved in making decisions of this type is not a policy decision, but
rather involves the exercise of a margin of appreciation relating to the facts of
individual cases. 26
Despite this evolution, the Courts continue to emphasise, as foundational prin-
ciples, the primacy of the executive in establishing policy in respect of immi-
gration matters, as well as the public interest in immigration control. 27 Judicial
reasoning invariably starts from the premise that the State is entitled to control
21. See Dauvergne (n 19); Legomsky, Immigration and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in
Britain and America (Clarendon Press 1997); Aleinikoff, Semblances of Sovereignty:
The Constitution, The State and American Citizenship (Harvard University Press 2002).
22. Dauvergne (n 19).
23. s 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1999.
24. An application for leave to apply for judicial review is required in the case of immig-
ration decisions. The application must show that there is a substantive case to be
made, and must generally be lodged within 14 days of the date on which the person
was notified of the decision. A decision of the High Court to refuse leave to apply
may only be appealed to the Supreme Court where the High Court certifies that its
decision involves a point of law of exceptional public interest and that it is desirable
in the public interest that such an appeal should be taken.
25. PO v Minister for Justice and Equality [2015] I ESC 64, para 15.
26. ibid at para 16.
27. See, for example, Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010]
IESC 3, per Hardiman J at para 82; Okunade [2012] IESC 49, per Clarke J at para 10.2;
PO vMinisterforJustice and Equality [2015] IESC 64, per Charleton J at para 34.
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the entry and residence of aliens, with the result that all rights-based claims
of those resisting removal are viewed through this framing lens. 28 The conse-
quences of this mode of reasoning can be seen in the narrow application of the
best interests of the child principle in the context of deportation proceedings
by the Court of Appeal in Dos Santos v Minister for Justice and Equality,29 and the
zero-tolerance approach towards private life claims of 'precarious' migrants in
Dos Santos, Cl v Minister for Justice and Equality30 and PO v Minister for Justice and
Equality.31
Weighing the Best Interests of the Child
The role and weight of the interests of children caught up in deportation pro-
ceedings have emerged as key issues in recent years: must the best interests of
the child be a primary consideration in a decision to deport? Where a citizen
child, or a 'settled migrant' (a person who has been a lawful immigrant for a
significant period of time) child, is involved, a rigorous balancing of the specific
circumstances of the individual child and their family and private life in Ireland
is required, which cannot be easily displaced by the general demands of the
immigration system. 3 2 Nonetheless, the scope of the family rights enjoyed by
citizen children under Article 41 of the Constitution has been a contentious
issue. In the 2015 decision in Esm6 v Minister for Justice and Law Reform,33 a
majority of the Supreme Court took a narrow approach to the definition of
the family, finding that '[w]hile there is undoubtedly a natural affection and
a desire to nurture ... between grandparents and their grandchildren, such
guarantees as are given in the Constitution are to the mother and father and
to their children.' 34 In this case, the majority judgment, delivered by Charleton J,
emphasised that the consideration of such rights could not be divorced from
the legal and factual context: here, the Court took a dim view of the fact that the
children's grandmother'was never a refugee'35 but had claimed asylum in order
to gain entry to Ireland to be help her daughter with her children.
28. See Dembour's analysis of the similar approach taken by the ECtHR, which she
terms the 'Strasbourg reversal. Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants: Study
of the European Court of Human Rights with an Inter-American Counterpoint (Oxford
University Press 2015) 25.
29. [2015] IECA 210.
30. [2015] IECA 192.
31. [2015] IESC 64.
32. See Oguekwe v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] 3 IR 795; EA and
PA v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IEHC 371.
33. [2015] IESC 26.
34. ibid para 35. This approach is in contrast to that of the High Court in XvMinister for
Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] 1 ILRM 444; and O'Leary vMinister forJustice
[2012] IEHC 80; [2012] IEHC 80.
35. ibid para 35.
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Non-citizen children who have no entitlement to be in the State are in a
particularly vulnerable position. In Dos Santos v Minister for Justice and Equality,3 6
both the High Court and the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that s 3 of
the Immigration Act 1999 must be read in the light of the best interests principle
set out in Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
This was due to the operation of Article 29.6 of the Constitution, which states:
'No international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the state save as
may be determined by the Oireachtas' Following previous authority,37 the High
Court was satisfied that Article 3(1) UNCRC'does not confer any directly enforce-
able rights on non-national children'.3 1 McDermott J rejected the idea that the
best interests principle needed to be a labelled as a'primary consideration, but
did not dispute that the best interests of the child must be given due and proper
regard and emphasis as part of the Minister's overall analysis (including taking
into account constitutional and Convention rights).39 This finding was upheld
by the Court of Appeal, which also found that the trial judge's decision was
strengthened by the coming into force of Article 42A of the Constitution on foot
of the children's rights referendum, as deportation decisions are not among the
types of decision (listed in Article 42A.4.1) in which the best interests of child
shall be the'paramount consideration' 40 Overall, then, the precise weight of chil-
dren's interests in the wider balancing exercise undertaken in deportation cases
is still somewhat uncertain, and will depend on the individual circumstances.
One of the most significant aspects of the findings in Dos Santos is the
High Court's conceptualisation of the requirement to take into account the
children's welfare or best interests as an element of the guarantee of fair pro-
cedures contained in Article 40.3 of the Constitution, which seemed to be
implicitly accepted by Finlay Geoghegan J in the Court of Appeal. 4 1 Given
the strength of the fair procedures guarantee in immigration cases and its
uncontested application to non-citizens, 42 this could mean that the rights of
the child in the deportation context are, in practice, well-protected under the
36. [2014] IEHC 559; [2015] IECA 210.
37. Kavanagh v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2002] 3 IR 97; N.S. vAnderson [2008] 3 IR 417;
Minister for State for immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1994-1995) 183 CLR 273.
38. [2014] IEHC 559, para 55. This was in contrast to the position in the UK, where the
Convention has been implemented by domestic legislation.
39. See also Oland OPI vRATand others [2015] IEHC 408.
40. Article 42A.4.1 states:'Provision shall be made by law that in the resolution of all pro-
ceedings (i) brought by the State, as guardian of the common good, for the purpose
of preventing the safety and welfare of any child from being prejudicially affected, or
(ii) concerning the adoption, guardianship or custody of, or access to, any child, the
best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration.'
41. ibid paras 40 and 60.
42. As confirmed by the Supreme Court in Re Article 26 and ss 5 and 70 of the Illegal
Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill, 1999 [2002] 2 IR 360, at 385 per Keane CJ; and Mallak v
Minister for Justice Equality & Law Reform [2012] IESC 59.
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Irish domestic framework. In Dos Santos, however, the Courts were satisfied
that that the interests of the five non-citizen children involved (who were in
settled in the education system in Ireland and the younger of whom could not
understand written Portuguese)'were to the forefront of the decision maker's
mind in accordance with the principles of fair procedures under Article 40.3
and section 3(6)'.43
It remains to be seen whether and how the relevant principles will be devel-
oped in line with the State's international treaty obligations. In 2016, the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child urged the State to 'ensure that the
rights enshrined in the Convention are guaranteed for all children under the
State party's jurisdiction, regardless of their migration status or that of their
parents,' and, in particular, to 'expeditiously adopt a comprehensive legal
framework that is in accordance with international human rights standards to
address the needs of migrant children in the State party.' 45 The Irish approach
to date is also at odds with the decision of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) in The Queen on the application of MA, BT, DA v Secretary of State
for the Home Department,4 6 in which the CJEU found that the best interests of
the child needed to be a primary consideration in all decisions adopted by the
Member States under Article 6 of the Dublin II Regulation 47 (concerning the
Member State responsible for processing the asylum claim of an unaccompa-
nied minor). 48 This was the first time that the CJEU had interpreted a provi-
sion of EU law expressly in light of Article 24 of the EU Charter, which provides
that '[i]n all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities
or private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consider-
ation' In Dos Santos, Finlay Geoghegan J in the Court of Appeal clarified that
the Charter did not apply to the deportation decisions taken by the Minister in
43. [2014] IEHC 559, para 60.
44. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the com-
bined third and fourth periodic reports of Ireland (29 January 2016; CRC/C/IRL/
CO/3-4) para 67.
45. ibid paras 67 and 68.
46. C-648/1 1 The Queen on the application of MA, BT, DA v Secretary of State for the Home
Department (4th Chamber, 6 June 2013).
47. Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria
and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an
asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national;
superseded by the "Dublin Ill Regulation": Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establish-
ing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member
States by a third-Country national or a stateless person.
48. See also In the Matter of an Application for Judicial Review by ALJ and A, B and C
[2013] NIQB 88 (14 August 2013), in which a transfer under the Dublin system to
the Republic of Ireland was blocked as the direct provision system was found to be
contrary to the best interests of the child.
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these cases,4 9 thus opening up a divergence between the approach to the best
interests of the child in the Irish law governing deportation and EU law.
Private Life and Participation in Community Life within the State
A second issue which has been recently explored in the Irish context is the
impact of the private life dimensions of Article 8 ECHR on the expulsion of
migrants who have developed social ties in the country of residence. While the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has long emphasised integration as
an important part of its consideration of the disruption of private and family
life in deportation casess0 the Irish cases generally focus on family rights rather
than private life. The impact of private life considerations in the Irish courts'
analysis of constitutional and convention rights and on the actual outcomes
of these cases has been weak to date." In a clear illustration of the limits of
legal claims to the protection of private life within the State, the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeal have recently followed a restrictive approach when the
applicant's private life in the State was developed in circumstances where their
legal status was'precarious'.2 In such cases, it will be very difficult for applicants
to show that Article 8 is potentially engaged in such a way as to require justifi-
cation and a proportionality analysis under Article 8(2).ss Even where Article 8
is found to be potentially engaged, it will require exceptional circumstances to
dislodge the presumption in favour of the State's entitlement to control immi-
gration such that expulsion would be disproportionate and unlawful.
In PO, the Supreme Court refused to restrain the deportation to Nigeria of a
woman and her nine-year old son, who was born, raised and educated in the
State (although was not an Irish citizen), on foot of its finding that the trial judge
was correct in finding that the refusal of the Minister to revoke the deportation
order should stand. The Court considered Article 8 issues, among other issues
raised by the revocation application. The judgments of MacMenamin J and
49. [2015] IECA 210, para 19.
50. See, for example, Uner v The Netherlands (2007) 45 EHRR 14, Slivenko v Latvia App
no 48321/99, (ECtHR, 9 October 2009); Balogun v United Kingdom App no 60286/09
(ECtHR, 10 April 2012).
51. See generally, Murphy, 'Challenging Deportation on the Basis of "Private Life":
The Evolving Impact of Article 8 on Irish Immigration Law, in Suzanne Egan, Liam
Thornton and Judy Walsh (eds), Ireland and the European Convention on Human
Rights: 60 Years and Beyond (Bloomsbury 2014).
52. Citing the language used in Nunez v Norway App no 55597/09 (ECtHR, 28 June 2011)
and Nnyanzi v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 18.
53. Article 8(2) provides:'There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.'
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Charleton J (with whom Laffoy J concurred on the substantive issues) focussed
on the entitlement of the State to control immigration, the precarious legal
status of the applicants, their extensive ties to Nigeria, the absence of any
family life issues, and the wide margin of appreciation of decision-making in
all the circumstances. MacMenamin J suggested that the extent of the ties to
Ireland would need to be 'overwhelming' to outweigh the entitlement of the
State to control entry into its territory, in the circumstances where the appli-
cants had had no right to be in the State since 2010. In respect of the child,
he stated:'The fact that an applicant may derive benefits from continuing res-
idence in the State, whether they be social or education, did not amount to
exceptional circumstances, as would give rise to an entitlement to remain in
Ireland'54 Charleton J discerned a number of legal principles from the ECHR case
law, including that 'those who create uncertainty as to their status within the
country to which they migrate, by claiming asylum rights that are unfounded,
cannot rely on mere presence to invoke Article 8 rights's He gave the idea of
the best interests of the child short shrift, stating: "The often-claimed separate
rights of children are, save for extraordinary circumstances, dependent upon
the approach of the parent'.5 6 He could not find any evidence that the Minister's
findings were adverse to any of these principles.
Given its finding that 'no legal rights' were involved, the Supreme Court
could not disturb the Minister's decision. However, an interesting and most
unusual feature of the case was the Supreme Court's appeal to the Minister
to exercise his discretion in a humane way, given 'that real issues of ministe-
rial discretion may arise in this case, which involve an 8 year old child, and his
mother, both of whom have now resided in this State for well nigh on 9 years'?s
Charleton J remarked:'As a matter of humanity, but not as a matter of law, it is
for the respondent Minister to ask herself how she feels it appropriate to con-
sider this matter in the exercise of her discretion:"I In putting the determination
of this claim into the non-justiciable 'policy' category of ministerial decisions,
the Supreme Court drew a bright line as to the limits of rights claims of precari-
ous migrants in the deportation setting.
The Court of Appeal followed a similar rationale - if a somewhat different
line of reasoning - in Cl and Dos Santos, both cases in which the elements of
private life had been created during a period of'precarious' residence in the
State (the applicants in Cl were unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicants; and
those in Dos Santos were a Brazilian man with an expired work permit and his
wife and five children). The constitutional private life arguments put forward
by the applicants in Dos Santos were rejected with little discussion, as Finlay
54. para 25.
55. para 35.
56. para 36.
57. Laffoy J agreed with these observations.
58. para 47.
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Geoghegan J found that non-citizen children do not have a personal right
under Article 40.3 to a private life within the State or to participate in commu-
nity life established in the State. She appeared to confine the rights of irregular
non-citizen children to their rights as a member of a family under Articles 41
and 42, and'certain personal rights'under Article 40.3, including fair procedures
rights and the rights set out in G vAn Bord Uchtdla.9 The wide-ranging unenu-
merated right of children'to be fed and to live, to be reared and educated, to
have the opportunity of working and of realising his or her full personality and
dignity as a human being, as set out in G,6 0 could provide a fruitful line of argu-
ment in future cases. However, she also found that the children in question did
not have a right under Article 40.3 to the community ties which they had made
in the State, and it is doubtful that the reference to the unenumerated rights of
children was intended to confer any additional protection against expulsion on
non-national children.
On the Convention arguments made by the applicants in both cases, Finlay
Geoghegan J drew a distinction between the nature of the consideration of the
private life rights of settled migrants and those in the State unlawfully, focus-
sing on the nature of the private life rights protected by Article 8 in each case.
She noted that there was no ECtHR decision directly on the question of whether
asylum seekers or irregular migrants can enjoy the type of private life experi-
enced by settled migrants, in terms of integration into the State and specific
social ties formed. Drawing on the ECtHR's decisions in Nnaynzi v UK, 61 Bensaid
v UK,62 and Balogun v UK,63 as well as applying the five-step test laid down in
the House of Lords decision in R (Razgar) v Home Secretary,64 she found that in
the case of residents without a legal right to reside, while the Court could take
into account private life in the sense of ties established within the State, this
would carry little weight in the overall balancing exercise. The most important
question was whether the applicants' broader private life right to physical and
moral integrity, and ability to form relationships, would be disproportionately
interfered with by the deportation, such as to engage the operation of Article 8.
In this case, a proportionality analysis was not required as the Court of Appeal
found that the decision of the Minister that the consequences of deportation
were not of sufficient gravity to potentially engage Article 8 was fair.
It will be almost impossible for Article 8 private life claims to reach the
high threshold set out in these cases. Following Dos Santos and CI, applicants
appear to face two obstacles. First, they must show that deportation will
have consequences of sufficient gravity to potentially engage A8. Following
59. Dos Santos, at para 10, referring in turn to the rights identified in G vAn Bord Uchtala
[1980] IR 32, 55-56.
60. Ibid.
61. (2008) 47 EHRR 18.
62. (2001) 33 EHRR 10.
63. App no 60286/09 (ECtHR, 10 April 2012).
64. [2004] 2 AC 368.
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Bensaid and Nnyanzi, the Court of Appeal found that this would require
'wholly exceptional circumstances' in the case of persons who were never
lawfully allowed to reside in the State except for the purposes of pursuing
an asylum claim. This effectively reversed the approach of the High Court,
where the trial judge had noted:'It is difficult to discern why the removal of
the children from their school would not constitute a grave consequence
sufficient to engage Article 8.'65 Deportation, by its nature, impacts on the
physical and moral integrity of an individual, as acknowledged by Finlay
Geoghegan J in Dos Santos. Indeed, Anderson notes that this is an aspect
of deportation which sits uneasily with liberal values. 6 6 This impact is not
however, of itself, enough to bring the circumstances within the scope of
Article 8. While 'settled migrants' can argue that their private life within
the State is ruptured by the expulsion, more short-term migrants, asylum
seekers, or those who are undocumented are essentially confined to claims
based on how their broad right to private life in the country of expulsion will
be affected. Indeed, in the subsequent High Court decision in Balchand &
anor v Minister for Justice and Equality,67 Humphreys J interpreted the Court
of Appeal's approach in Cl as meaning that "in general, persons whose sit-
uation was 'precarious' did not enjoy private and family rights of sufficient
weight to engage art. 8".68 Moreover, even where an applicant can show that
the minimum gravity requirement is satisfied, it will be almost impossible
to show that that the consequences in question outweigh the State's enti-
tlement to control immigration such that a violation of Article 8 actually
occurs.6
9
Insiders and Outsiders: Deportation as a 'Membership-Defining' Tool
of the State
The decisions discussed above, particularly Dos Santos and CI, raise doctrinal
questions in respect of the correct approach to private life claims in deporta-
tion cases, as well as the application of the best interests of the child principle.
What would constitute the exceptional circumstances necessary to give rise to
65. Clv Minister for Justice and Equality [2014] IEHC 447, at para 29. For commentary on
the High Court decision, see Patricia Brazil,'Asylum and Immigration Law, Annual
Review of Irish Law 2014, 12, at 14.
66. Anderson, Us and Them: The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control (Oxford
University Press 2013).
67. [2016] IEHC 132.
68. [2016] IEHC 132, at para. 18. See also O.O.A. & anor v Minister for Justice and Equality
[2016] IEHC 468. CfHigh Court decision in Luximon vMinisterforJustice andEquality
[2015] IEHC 227. Luximon and Balchandare under appeal.
69. See PO v Minister for Justice and Equality at para 39, citing Agbonlahor v Minister
for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2007] 4 IR 309; and CN v United Kingdom [2005]
2 AC 296.
vol 390() ] 269
Dublin University Law Journal
an entitlement to reside in Ireland on the basis of private life established here
by persons with precarious legal status? Is it appropriate to effectively classify
an asylum seeker whose claim is unsuccessful as an 'unlawful' migrant (as was
done repeatedly in Dos Santos)? What is the impact of Article 42A of the Irish
Constitution on the rights of migrant children? Moreover, McMahon correctly
identifies important issues relating to the Irish courts'interpretation of the ECHR
case law, the role of the'minimum gravity'requirement, and the correct weight
to be accorded to the precariousness of an individual's migration status. 70
Aside from these questions, these cases tell us much about the symbolic
power of deportation in modern liberal democracies. In PO, the Supreme Court
classes the expulsion of a nine-year-old boy who had spent his whole life in the
State as a'matter of humanity'rather than of legal principle, whilst recognising
the potential injustice of the proposed deportation. In Dos Santos the Court of
Appeal clearly establishes that non-citizens do not have a constitutionally pro-
tected right to participate in community life in the State. In draining the private
life within Ireland of'precarious' residents of any real weight, legal recognition
of community membership is denied to people who have resided in Ireland for
considerable periods of time. In these cases, border rules operated to efface the
lived experiences of those involved, all of whom had argued to the Minister that
they had integrated into Irish society. Deportation is, in this way, revealed as a
powerful,'membership-defining'7 1 tool of the state. It is a tool which Dembour
argues'verges on being inhumane, by relegating those which the law charac-
terises as "aliens" outside the society to which, like it or not, they belong' 72 This
view has particular resonance in light of the cases explored in this article.
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